Mexico Issues New Nuclear Material Transport Security Rules

SENER published NOM-042-NUCL-2026, introducing stricter tracking, route planning, surveillance, and physical security requirements for radioactive and fissile material transport in Mexico.

Mexico’s Ministry of Energy (SENER) has published a new mandatory standard that strengthens security, tracking, route planning, and operational controls for transporting fissile substances and radioactive materials across the country.

The NOM-042-NUCL-2026, published in the Official Gazette of the Federation (DOF), establishes a risk-based framework for categorizing materials such as enriched uranium, plutonium, and radioactive substances used in industrial, medical, scientific, and energy activities. The category assigned to each shipment will determine the physical nuclear-security measures required throughout its transport.

The regulation was prepared by the National Commission for Nuclear Safety and Safeguards (CNSNS), an agency under SENER. It will apply to permit holders authorized to transport fissile substances and other radioactive materials by land or water.

The standard will enter into force on Jan. 11, 2027, a total of 180 calendar days after the day following its publication on July 15.

Tracking, Surveillance, and Route Controls

Under the new regulation, transportation units must have continuous tracking systems capable of reporting their location according to the approved itinerary and detecting unplanned stops. Shipments must remain under the in-person supervision of transportation personnel throughout the journey. When an overnight stop is necessary, operators must implement additional measures to protect the vehicle and its cargo.

Personnel must also have reliable communication systems throughout the operation. In the event of a physical nuclear-security incident, the shipper or carrier must notify the designated response force or contact emergency services through 911. Before every shipment, operators must verify that access points to the packages inside the transport unit are closed and equipped with devices that indicate whether they have been opened or manipulated. Security measures must be reviewed again after every stop.

Radioactive consignments generally must travel in closed vehicles. Exceptions will be permitted for individual packages weighing more than 2,000kg or whose dimensions make loading and unloading in closed units impractical.

The regulation also requires companies to establish primary and alternative routes. Operators must avoid areas affected by natural disasters, civil disturbances, organized crime, known threats, or other conditions that could compromise the shipment.

Schedules and itineraries should be varied to prevent routine transportation operations from becoming predictable. The recipient must immediately notify the shipper once a consignment arrives.

Shared Responsibility Across the Supply Chain

The standard makes transportation providers jointly responsible for compliance when a third party is contracted to carry the material. When security responsibilities are divided among the shipper, carrier, and recipient, their contracts must clearly establish the functions and obligations assigned to each participant.

For higher-risk or heavier fissile-material shipments, operators will need to obtain specific authorization from CNSNS for each movement. The commission may also require companies to apply the measures corresponding to a higher security category when a threat assessment justifies additional protection.

Every shipper must identify the category of the consignment or package in its Physical Nuclear Security Plan for Transportation. The plan must include the procedure or calculation used to determine that classification.

The regulation follows a graded approach, meaning security requirements increase according to the potential risk associated with the material. Factors used to categorize shipments include the quantity transported, radiation levels, physical and chemical form, accessibility, attractiveness for unauthorized use, and potential use in a weapon.

Regulation Moves From Proposal to Implementation

SENER submitted NOM-042 for regulatory review in June 2026 amid concerns that transportation represents one of the most vulnerable stages in the management of radioactive and fissile materials, reports MBN. The earlier proposal sought to address the risk of theft, unauthorized removal, sabotage, and the uncontrolled release of radioactive substances. These incidents could expose the public to hazardous materials, contaminate the environment, disrupt strategic infrastructure, and create wider national-security risks.

The regulatory file states that radioactive sources have previously been stolen during transportation, generating radiological, economic, and social consequences. Authorities argued that the absence of rules specifically focused on physical nuclear security during transit increased the probability of materials being removed from regulatory control. 

SENER estimated that implementation will create approximately MX$677,204 in annual costs across 244 permit holders, equivalent to roughly MX$2,775 per operator. Expenses include classifying materials, modifying procedures and operational documents, installing tamper-indicating devices and delay mechanisms, and training transportation personnel.

The government estimated annual benefits of approximately MX$17.4 million through lower risks of theft, material loss, and radiological emergencies, significantly exceeding projected compliance costs. The standard does not create new administrative procedures or modify existing authorization processes.

NOM-042 also supports Mexico’s obligations under the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and its amendment. These international instruments require participating countries to establish national provisions protecting nuclear materials against theft, unauthorized removal, and sabotage. 

With the publication of the final standard, affected carriers and permit holders now have six months to update transportation plans, contractual responsibilities, communication protocols, tracking technology, personnel training, and physical-security controls before the requirements become mandatory.