ASEA Conducts Aerial Inspection Over Gulf After Spill
By Perla Velasco | Journalist & Industry Analyst -
Tue, 05/19/2026 - 11:58
ASEA has conducted an aerial evaluation over the Campeche Sound following a major offshore hydrocarbon spill that has impacted 630km of Mexico's Gulf coastline. The operation, which involved monitoring the strategic Cantarell and Ku-Maloob-Zaap production complexes, highlights critical infrastructure risks and severe environmental governance friction between state authorities, who attribute the slick to natural seepage and an illegal vessel discharge, and civil society organizations documenting a ruptured PEMEX subsea pipeline.
ASEA reported on May 17 that it carried out an aerial inspection over the Campeche Sound to evaluate contingency actions following the hydrocarbon spill reported since early February. The operation was coordinated with the Secretaría de Marina (SEMAR) and PEMEX, with the reconnaissance flight originating from the PEMEX air terminal in Ciudad del Carmen and covering the offshore production complexes of Cantarell, Ku-Maloob-Zaap, Abkatún-Pol-Chuc, and Litoral-Tabasco.
The May 17 flyover marks more than three months since the spill was first detected offshore and more than 10 weeks since it became a national environmental crisis that drew scrutiny over the government's transparency, response speed, and the integrity of PEMEX's aging subsea infrastructure.
What the Inspection Found
In Akal-C, within the Cantarell Production Asset, inspectors confirmed the installation is operating normally but identified plumes around the processing center. According to information provided by PEMEX, these formations are associated with the Cantarell chapopotera, a natural hydrocarbon seepage in the area. A vessel was observed conducting mechanical dispersion activities using water in the vicinity.
In Ku-S, within the Ku-Maloob-Zaap production asset, authorities confirmed that facilities are operating normally with no iridescence observed on the water surface. In the Batab complex, within the Abkatún-Pol-Chuc asset, plumes with white-silver hues were confirmed. PEMEX stated that no containment loss events have occurred and that these plumes correspond to the Cantarell chapopotera.
ASEA stated it will continue conducting periodic verification overflights in coordination with PEMEX and other federal institutions to ensure the protection of people and the environment.
How the Crisis Unfolded
The scale of the contamination, which government authorities acknowledged publicly only at the end of March, and the circumstances surrounding its origin placed PEMEX's operational reliability and environmental governance under some of their most intense scrutiny in years. At a joint press conference on March 26, senior officials from SEMARNAT, SEMAR, SENER, ASEA, and PEMEX attributed the spill to three sources: an illegal discharge by an unidentified vessel near Coatzacoalcos and two natural hydrocarbon seepages near Coatzacoalcos and the Cantarell Complex.
That official account was disputed almost immediately. More than 17 civil society organizations, including Greenpeace México, CartoCrítica, Geocomunes, and the Mexican Center for Environmental Law (CEMDA), documented that from Feb. 6, hydrocarbon slicks were visible in satellite imagery directly above the pipeline identified as OLD AK C, a 36in crude line transporting oil between the AKAL-C platform and the Dos Bocas Maritime Terminal. Between Feb. 7 and 14, the vessel Árbol Grande, specialized in pipeline repair and operated under PEMEX contract, remained anchored over the pipeline while a large hydrocarbon slick was visible and support vessels were observed conducting water cannon dispersal operations. The organizations characterized this as early knowledge of the spill that was not translated into public alerts or community protection measures.
By March 21, 630km of coastline had been documented as affected, practically the entire extent of the Corredor Arrecifal del Suroeste del Golfo de México, with 51 sites reporting chapopote presence and impacts on beaches, mangroves, fauna, and the livelihoods of coastal communities.
The Response and Its Limits
The government deployed more than 2,200 personnel, along with aircraft, vessels, drones, and marine barriers in mitigation operations. By late March, 430t of hydrocarbon had been collected and 223km of coastline cleaned. PEMEX deployed more than 700 field workers and allocated MX$15 million through its Community and Environmental Support Program (PACMA) to affected fishing communities, including fuel and medical services.
ASEA filed a criminal complaint on March 27 before the Attorney General for the possible commission of environmental crimes. Of 13 vessels identified as potential suspects that were anchored near Coatzacoalcos before the event, seven had been inspected by late March, five in Coatzacoalcos, one in Dos Bocas, and one in Tampico, with the remaining six placed under international maritime alert.
From 2008 to 2024, Mexico recorded 1,146 cases of soil pollution caused by hydrocarbons, with PEMEX responsible for 79% of the total contamination, impacting more than 13.6 million m³ of soil. The Norwegian Government Pension Fund excluded PEMEX from its portfolio in 2025 due to concerns over the company's sustainability commitments.
The Observatory and the Open Questions
More than a month after oil first began washing ashore, the Mexican government created the Permanent Observatory for the Gulf of Mexico, coordinated by SECIHTI. By the time of the announcement, cleanup operations had recovered 894.2t of hydrocarbons across 48 beaches spanning more than 630km of coastline, with 32 beaches declared hydrocarbon-free and over 3,300 personnel still active in the field.
The Gulf spill lands at a moment when PEMEX is attempting to rebuild institutional credibility. The company closed 2025 with its lowest debt level in 11 years and a series of credit rating upgrades. Yet, the spill reopens concerns about infrastructure integrity that financial improvements alone cannot resolve. PEMEX's pipeline network is aging, much of it dating from the 1970s and 1980s, and years of underinvestment in maintenance have left the system vulnerable. The Fitch and Moody's upgrades that accompanied the 2025 financial recovery were explicitly conditioned on continued progress in operational and safety governance.









