PEMEX Fuel Imports Surpass Earnings From Crude Exports

For the first time in at least 36 years, PEMEX is spending more money buying refined oil products from abroad than it is earning from selling crude oil internationally. According to El Economista, PEMEX exported an average of 431,801 barrels per day of crude in the first five months of 2026, 15% less than its refined product imports over the same period, which averaged 507.227Mb/d. The inversion of that ratio is historically anomalous, and it is the clearest operational expression of a trade-off the Sheinbaum administration made deliberately but whose fiscal cost has now crossed a symbolic threshold.

For the acquisition of gasoline, diesel, and jet fuel from abroad, PEMEX spent an average of US$1.601 billion per month between January and May, a figure 32% higher than the US$1.087 billion per month it obtained from selling crude oil over the same period.

How It Happened: The Refinery-First Policy and Its Limits

Since MORENA took office, then-president López Obrador committed to reducing oil exports in order to refine domestically the crude the state company extracts from Mexico's reservoirs. However, he also assured that as industrial transformation of the refineries increased, fuel imports would fall in the same proportion — which has not been possible.

The structural gap between that promise and the operational reality is now visible in the monthly trade data. In the first five months of 2026, crude exports were 35% below the prior year and have maintained a downward trend for three consecutive years. Compared to 2018, when PEMEX was exporting 1.141MMb/dy, the indicator has fallen 65% in the average of the first five months of the year.

Refined product imports have also fallen, down 17% year-on-year between January and May 2026 — and have been reduced across the last three consecutive years, but at a slower pace: 5% in 2024 and 7% in 2025. From 2018 levels of 975.001Mb/d, refined product imports have fallen only 48%. In May, PEMEX utilized 47.5% of its installed refining capacity in Mexico.

Crude exports have fallen faster than refined product imports. The refinery-first strategy was designed to reduce the latter by substituting domestic production; the reduction has occurred, but insufficiently to offset the more dramatic collapse in crude export volumes. The result is the historic inversion documented by El Economista.

The Financial Consequences

The fall in oil exports has negatively impacted PEMEX's finances, as reflected in its latest operational indicators: by May, the company obtained a revenue figure 13% below the prior year, accumulating four consecutive years of annual declines — following a 26% reduction in 2023, 81% in 2024, and 32% in 2025 compared to the prior year.

Those cumulative revenue reductions explain the fiscal dependency dynamic that México Evalúa documented in June: between January and April 2026, PEMEX contributed MX$73.3 billion in oil revenues to the federal government while the government transferred MX$76.5 billion back, creating a net loss to the state. The federal government transferred over MX$100 billion to PEMEX in the first six months of 2026, 6.2% more than over the same period in 2025, as the company continued to require sovereign support to meet its debt obligations and operational needs.

The Geopolitical Complication

The Iran conflict's price surge created a temporary reprieve within the larger structural deterioration. PEMEX exported a monthly average of 431.801Mb/d in the January-May period at a blend price that reached US$100.7/b in May — the highest level since June 2022, driven by Hormuz disruption. May export revenues reached US$1.603 billion, the highest since December 2024. Yet even with that exceptional price environment, export revenues for the five-month period averaged only US$1.087 billion per month — because volumes remained too compressed to fully capitalize on the price windfall.

With Brent now back near US$72/b following the US-Iran sanctions waiver and the fifth consecutive OPEC+ quota increase, the price tailwind that partially offset volume losses through May is unwinding. At lower prices and with export volumes already constrained by the refinery-first policy, the second half of 2026 will not offer the same partial cushion.