USMCA Review: Narcotics Indictments and US Trade Leverage

The USMCA review was always going to be an uphill battle for Mexico. No matter who was going to occupy the White House from January 2025, the United States was to have the upper hand at the negotiation table from a party that had broken with the agreement by meddling with energy policy, instigating protectionism measures, bringing about impending judicial and antidemocratic reforms, and passively overseeing a wave of insecurity. The United States has just been given another jewel to grant them greater leverage still: an unwillingness to cooperate with the extradition of politicians accused of criminal activity.

On Wednesday, April 29, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration announced the unsealing of an indictment charging Gov. Ruben Rocha Moya, Sen. Enrique Inzunza Cazariz, and eight other officials of the state of Sinaloa, of partnering with the Sinaloa Cartel to distribute massive quantities of narcotics to the United States, among other things (United States Attorney’s Office, 2026). Various sources are also saying that the US administration is likely to demand that Mexico hand over more top-level government officials within the next few weeks as a result of extensive interviewing of cartel leaders extradited in recent months and years.

The indictment itself is preliminary, and the forecasts are speculative; however, the whole thing now looks ominous for the Mexican government. This is the first time that the US government is calling out Mexican governmental officials for being “one of them.” The indictment gives Mexico 60 days to cough up the implicated politicians; at the end of that time the United States will provide hard evidence backing up the claims of the crimes. Many are confident that the Trump administration will remove Ruben Rocha and possibly others by force beforehand, employing a similar strategy to that used for the Gustavo Maduro operation in Venezuela at the beginning of the year.

I started this article with the subject of free trade agreements because I suspect the United States is likely to use the indictments as leverage for the USMCA review. Although one never knows what is going to happen; indeed, one or two of these suspects/culprits may be fished out by force sooner than later. I remain confident, however, that the review will probably be the setting for making demands.

Mexico is so dependent on trade and investment with the United States that it would make sense for President Donald Trump’s administration to use this as the perfect opportunity to coerce its partner. Trump would wait for the final whistle at the World Cup tournament to blow and then allow for the real games to begin! They would then use the indictment of these top officials as an ultimatum (conveniently coinciding with the 60-day period Mexico is given to round up the accused politicians), as well as the unveiling of more accused top officials, additionally demanding the reversal of policies that are in direct conflict with the USMCA agreement. It could be that US officials would state that the renegotiation of commercial clauses could only begin once Mexico concedes with these terms.

If this looks far-fetched, something very similar happened at the beginning of the Brexit negotiations between the UK and the European Union, when The European Union Negotiating Directives set out a series of negotiation guidelines after the UK officially triggered Article 50 to leave the Union. The European Commission was clear in establishing that the UK could not only focus negotiations around matters of tariff and non-tariff barriers, investment and services. They made sure that before any matters of trade policy were discussed, negotiations would first cover the protection of affected European and non-European citizens, the settling of financial obligations, the redefinition of external borders, international commitments, legal certainty for member entities, and the legal status of the European Court of Justice as part of a two-phased negotiation process (European Commission, 2017).

Politics is now an integral part of free trade agreements, whether we like it or not. During the first renegotiation of the North American Free Trade Agreement, both Mexico and the United States determined that it was necessary to bring in issues that were traditionally outside a regular FTA, such as intellectual property, digital trade, anticorruption, state-owned policy (energy sovereignty), competition policy, among others. (Office of the United States Trade Representative, 2020).

At times, free trade agreements cannot materialize at all due to political conflicts. As a case in point, the South Korea-China-Japan Free Trade Agreement is on hold due to severe diplomatic tensions, even though the economic benefits would be enormous (Ji Siqi, 2025).

This particular deal would be a logical outgrowth of the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), a working trading block designed to facilitate regional supply chains in 15 Asian member states, but with political fallouts from nations such as India (DFAT, 2024).

The recently signed European Union-Mercosur Partnership Agreement has also run into political opposition from unions, farmers, national interests, and environmentalists alike, putting its ratification into doubt (Ganter, 2026).

In conclusion, it is now difficult to find an example of a free trade agreement that is able to steer clear of political issues affecting or deterring its negotiated outcome. Donald Trump likes quick deals; The USMCA review looks highly complex and will test his patience, as well as Mexico’s willingness to concede its ideology as well as a questionable official or more.