The 2025 US National Security Strategy and Latin America's Future

The 2025 US National Security Strategy (2025 US NSS), published on Dec. 4 under the Donald Trump administration, incorporates the "America First" doctrine. It prioritizes fundamental interests such as border security, economic prosperity — aiming for a US$40 trillion economy — and a dominant military, while simultaneously ending the promotion of democracy abroad — a claim Venezuelans, especially these days, would have trouble believing. Key changes include a strong deterrent against China in the Indo-Pacific, trade rebalancing, improved maritime security for supply chains, and urging Europe to assume its defense responsibilities. There is a softer tone toward Russia, emphasizing strategic stability, with a focus on the Western Hemisphere and US technological leadership in artificial intelligence and biotechnology.

How does the NSS address minerals?

The 2025 US NSS emphasizes mineral security as vital to economic strength and the defense industrial base, addressing US dependence on mineral imports. This strategy reorients policy toward Africa, shifting from aid to trade and investment, and focuses on the continent's 30% of global reserves through partnerships in mining and energy (nuclear, natural gas). Key initiatives include the Lobito Corridor railway for transporting minerals from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) to Zambia, bypassing Chinese routes, and conflict mediation (DRC-Rwanda, for example) to ensure stable mining operations. Domestically, it promotes the relocation of production and lists 60 minerals as critical by the US Geological Survey (USGS) to reduce the influence of adversaries, particularly China.

What Does This Mean for the Western Hemisphere?

The NSS prioritizes the Western Hemisphere under the well-known “Monroe Doctrine,” now called the “Donroe Doctrine,” referring to Donald Trump. This strategy affirms US preeminence in protecting national territory, controlling migration, combating cartels, and denying adversaries, especially China and Russia, access to strategic assets, including critical minerals.

Regarding mineral resources, the NSS considers the Western Hemisphere a key source for diversifying supply chains, moving away from dependence on adversaries, particularly China. It calls for collaboration with regional governments and companies to invest in access to critical minerals, as well as building strong energy infrastructure.

These investments aim to generate profits for US companies while simultaneously improving economic strength and national security. The strategy emphasizes the exclusion of non-hemispheric competitors from ownership or control of vital mineral resources, ports, and infrastructure in Latin America and the Caribbean. We have already seen how the United States is striving to remove Chinese operators from the Panama Canal, although it must balance this against the potential closure of rare earth exports to the United States, which would completely cripple the defense and technology industries.

The countries rich in lithium (Argentina, Bolivia, Chile), copper (Peru, Chile), nickel (Caribbean countries such as Guatemala, the Dominican Republic, and Colombia), and rare earth elements position the region as vital for US reindustrialization and defense needs. Canada and Mexico are linked to broader trade rebalancing initiatives against China, although the focus remains on countering foreign influence in South America.

Overall, mineral targets are integrated into a broader hemispheric agenda of dominance, combining economic opportunities with geopolitical exclusion to ensure reliable supplies from friendly sources, essential for technology, energy, and military capabilities.

How Should Latin America Leverage the NSS?

For Latin American nations rich in these resources, the optimal strategy involves proactive alignment to unlock US investments (developing a stable regulatory framework and expediting environmental and social permitting), technology, and markets without ceding sovereignty, focusing on the minerals the United States requires, primarily copper, nickel, and lithium.

1. Negotiate reciprocal bilateral agreements: Capitalize on the US urgency to diversify its supply chain by seeking agreements like the critical minerals agreement proposed by Peru, demanding commitments for joint ventures, infrastructure (ports, railways), and financing. Insist on technology transfer for local refining, moving from exporting raw materials to value-added processing (similar to what Indonesia did in its relationship with China), to boost local income and employment. For example, exporting copper cathodes instead of copper concentrate, or exporting refined nickel instead of ferronickel or nickel ore. 

2. Strategically reduce adversarial influence: Phase out Chinese contracts in mining and port projects to curry favor with the United States, gaining benefits such as expedited permitting, intelligence sharing, and tariff reductions. Form coalitions of "regional champions" (Chile-Peru-Argentina for copper and lithium and Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Colombia for nickel, for example) for collective bargaining,, which will increase their influence.  

3. Strengthen national capacity and governance: Invest in mining reforms that meet ESG criteria to attract private capital, in line with the NSS objectives of achieving stable and transparent supply chains. 

4. Economic and social development requires abundant energy: Perhaps the time has come to promote the use of nuclear energy to establish a solid base capable of meeting the country's energy needs and laying the foundation for development. El Salvador has already included it in its plans, why haven't the rest of the countries?

The Weight of Reality?

It's easy to write a strategy like the 2025 US NSS, but implementation is more complicated. Although the Trump administration still has three years to implement it, the dominant forces prefer the status quo, that everything stays as it is, rather than ride a wave of changes whose duration is uncertain. Even with the possible election of JD Vance, this policy would likely come to an end in no more than eight years.

China's influence in Latin America is strong and deeply rooted in several countries, such as Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Brazil, partly due to the advantages China offers and partly due to the US's own attitude, which, by sanctioning its ideological adversaries, has created the ideal environment for establishing relations with China, which is forging financing and trade ties that the United States has denied.  Russia is an example of what sanctions can do: Russia is now more interconnected to China than ever before. 

Criticism has increased regarding the excessive use of ESG criteria, which, in fact, paralyze economies instead of fostering responsible development. This has been seen primarily in Panama, Guatemala, and El Salvador, where mining is practically at a standstill. It is also observed in Mexico, with the rejection of open-pit mining, the halt in granting new mining concessions, and the nationalization of lithium; and in Chile, with the excessive use of sectoral environmental permits.  Colombia has also been hit by the climate change ideology strongly by the last US administration, where mining has been identified as a villain.  The previous US administrations bear significant responsibility for this, having supported, through their foreign policy, environmental and human rights groups that have promoted poverty and migration to the United States.