Constitutional Amendments to the Judiciary Branch

On the afternoon of Sept. 15, 2024, minutes before the celebration of Mexico’s Independence Day, Mexican President Andrés Manuel López Obrador’s decree was published in the Official Gazette of the Federation, amending, modifying, and derogating various provisions of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States regarding reforms to the judiciary branch.

This reform is the first of a package of 20 constitutional amendments proposed by the president in February 2024, which are aimed to serve as guidelines for President-elect Claudia Sheinbaum as she prepares to take office after the current president leaves office on Oct. 1, 2024.

Both the initiative and its approval process have polarized Mexican society, as it has been heavily criticized by both national and international media, including Mexico's main trading partners. The criticisms focus on both the formal process and the object of the reform. On a formal level, although the initiative was introduced in February, its approval process was carried out in record-breaking time.

The Chamber of Deputies discussed and approved the initiative in a 15-hour session on Sept. 4. Subsequently, in the early morning hours of Sept. 11, the Senate approved it and, just 21 hours later, it received favorable votes from 17 state congresses, thus meeting the constitutional requirements for a constitutional amendment. The speed of this process meant that expert opinions suggesting adjustments for better implementation were neither heard nor considered. It is worth mentioning that this occurred amid a national strike by the federal judiciary and despite several suspensions granted by district judges in a series of amparo trials filed against the reform process.

Before addressing the main criticisms of the substance of the amendments, it is necessary to examine the key material changes:

One of the most notable aspects of the reform is that the heads of judicial bodies, such as Supreme Court justices, electoral magistrates, circuit magistrates, and district judges, will be elected by direct popular vote. The powers of the union and an evaluation committee will nominate candidates for these positions.

The number of Supreme Court justices has been reduced from 11 to 9, their term has been reduced from 15 to 12 years, and the presidency's term has been reduced to two years. Furthermore, the two chambers of the Supreme Court have been suppressed, as the constitutional court will now only sit in plenary, and its sessions will be public.

Similarly, the Federal Judiciary Council, originally responsible for the general administration of the federal judiciary, has been eliminated and replaced with a disciplinary tribunal and judicial administration body.

Moreover, the operation of funds, trusts, mandates, and similar contracts for the judiciary has been prohibited.

In practical terms, the reform sets deadlines for resolving cases: fiscal matters must be resolved within six months, and criminal cases within one year. Failure to meet these deadlines will result in penalties for judges.

Amparos and suspensions against general norms cannot be granted for general effects, but rather, shall only be granted to the specific person or entity that requested it.

Constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality will be resolved with six votes of a qualified majority.

The amendments approved by this reform have several impacts on the current administration of justice, judicial independence and public economy, specifically: 

•    Impact on Workers: The election of federal judiciary members by popular vote has been heavily criticized since there is a large number of individuals who have aspired to head judicial bodies for decades and have gone through extensive preparation. This amendment obstructs access to these positions, as aspirants will now face a popular election for which they have not been prepared.

•    Risk to Judicial Independence: Constitutional law expert Diego Valadés has pointed out that, under the popular vote scheme, judicial candidates will be nominated by the three branches of government, granting the presidency the highest concentration of power in Mexican history. This would inevitably result in the loss of judicial independence, as the lists sponsored by the presidency and parliamentary majority will have the greatest chances of success, thereby weakening the rule of law. Similarly, Mariana Campos, director of the civil organization México Evalúa, has noted that the government is creating an institutional infrastructure that will exert external pressure on judges to act not according to the law and the facts, but to maintain their political positions.

•    Foreign Investment and Economic Stability: It has been reported that the judicial reform has raised alarms in various economic sectors, as several financial entities recommended their clients to reduce their exposure to Mexico when making investment decisions. Furthermore, the Employers Confederation of the Mexican Republic (Coparmex) warned in a public letter that the reform could jeopardize the country's economic stability.

Given the forthcoming constitutional crisis, several constitutional law experts have suggested that the Supreme Court of Justice could overturn the constitutional reform. However, for this to happen, the court would need to further develop its current criteria, as it has so far held that the constitutional reform power (both chambers of Congress and the majority of state legislatures) is only limited in terms of procedure, not substance. Therefore, an exhaustive and complex constitutional argumentation process will be necessary to restore national stability and the separation of powers.